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Article 11

NOTES
THE TRIAL OF PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENTS:
SHOULD THE GHOST BE LAID TO REST?
I. Introduction
The Constitution of the United States provides four methods for the removal
of a President from office: (1) If the President is serving his first term in office,
he may be removed through defeat at the polls when he seeks reelection; (2) If
the President is serving his second term, he will automatically be removed at the
end of that term by the operation of the twenty-second amendment; (3) If the
chief executive becomes disabled, he may be replaced through the procedures set
forth in the recently adopted twenty-fifth amendment; and (4) The President
may be impeached and removed from office upon conviction for "Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." 1 Of these four methods, only
the last has not been the subject of intensive study and controversy during recent
years. This concern, currently evidenced in the debate over reform of the
electoral college which chooses the President,2 reflects a widespread realization of
the importance of the chief executive in our present federal governmental structure. The power and responsibilities of the nation's highest elective office have
grown enormously since 1787, and many of the procedures then set down for
the election and removal of presidents now appear inadequate and outdated.
Probably the most dangerously inadequate of all these provisions, and perhaps
the only ones which were already outdated at the time of their adoption, are
those relating to the impeachment of a President. This Note will examine some
of the defects, both substantive and procedural, of those provisions, and suggest
a method of reform.
II. The Grounds for Impeachment
The substantive grounds which the Constitution provides for the impeachment of the chief executive and other civil officers of the United States, although
brief, are far from clear. Article II, section 4 states that: "The President, Vice
President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from
Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors." De Tocqueville, for one, found this a most unfortunate choice of phraseology. He wrote that "[n]othing can be more alarming
than the vagueness with which political offenses, properly so called, are described in the laws of America."' Apparently, the men who wrote the Constitution did not share the Frenchman's alarm. De Tocqueville was worried
1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. Of course, the President may also remove himself from office
by not seeking reelection for a second term, by resigning while in office (which none have yet
done), or simply through death in office.
2 See generally COMMISSION ON ELECTO AL COLLEGE REFORM, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N,
ELECTING THE PRESIDENT

3

(1967).

1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 114 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
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because he saw impeachment as a tool which might be used by some future
congressional majority to dominate or destroy the executive branch of the government.4 The framers of the Constitution, on the other hand, saw the broad
impeachment power as a safeguard which the people might use to deliver themselves from the grasp of a power-hungry executive.' The nineteenth century
commentator on constitutional law, John Norton Pomeroy, expressed this attitude
well:
Narrow the scope of impeachment, and the restraint over the acts of rulers
is lessened. If any fact respecting the Constitution is incontrovertible, it is
that the convention which framed, and the people who adopted it, while
providing a government sufficiently stable and strong, intended to deprive
all officers, from the highest to the lowest, of any opportunity to violate their
public duties, to enlarge their authority, and thus to encroach gradually or
suddenly upon the liberties of the citizen.6
Granted, then, that the impeachment power of Congress is broad; the
question yet remains, "How broad?" One must assume that the term "other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors," albeit vague, has some meaning. Taking the
whole range of conduct of which a civil officer, and more especially a President,
of the United States is capable, which of his acts are properly included under
the heading of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors," and which are not? Legal
theoreticians have been addressing themselves to this question almost since the
beginning of the Republic. Predictably, there have been differences of opinion
between them.
According to the conventional wisdom that prevails in this particular corner
of the law, all interpretations of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" must proceed
from an initial examination of English precedents. This reasoning is founded on
the supposition that, since the phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" had been
used for some centuries by Parliament in describing impeachable offenses, "that
ancient formula was adopted by the Convention with the construction which
had been given it in the English system, for the good and sufficient reason that,
without such construction, it was meaningless."' While the commentators share
this assumption as a sort of common starting point, they quickly differ as to
precisely what meaning the troublesome phrase actually had acquired in parliamentary usage. One group, who may be referred to as the broad constructionists,
lumps all the precedents together and concludes that "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" had no very definite meaning at all in England. Rather, they argue,
it was "in the nature of a term of art,"' and was simply used to describe any
conduct which the current Parliament happened to find sufficiently objectionable.

4 See id. at 114-15.

5 William Davie, for instance, claimed that if the President "be not impeachable whilst
in office, he will spare no efforts or means whatever to get himself re-elected." 2 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 64 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter cited as
FARRAND].
6 J. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION
STATES 490 '(3rd ed. 1875).

7
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Taylor, The American Law of Impeachment, 180 N. Am. REv. 502, 509 (1905).
Brown, The Impeachment of the Federal Judiciary, 26 HLtv. L. REv. 684, 690 (1913).
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Thus, persons have been impeached for giving bad counsel to the king,
advising a prejudicial peace, enticing the king to act against the advice of
Parliament, purchasing offices, giving medicine to the king without advice of
physicians, preventing other persons from giving counsel to the king except
in their presence, and procuring exorbitant personal grants from the king.9
The virtue of this broad interpretation, as applied to America, isalleged to lie in
its flexibility:
The internal evils which undermine the polity of a state are too insidious to
predetermine; the nefarious workings of political craft are too elusive to
classify in advance of their overt manifestation. Indeed, the wisdom of the
ages multiplied by eternity would not suffice to devise a system of positive
laws that would adequately anticipate the ingenuities of selfish ambition and
the machinations of avarice and greed and graft in the administration of
the affairs of government. 10
This broad interpretation has been seriously advanced before the Senate
sitting as a court of impeachment on only two occasions. It was rejected both
times. The first occasion was during the abortive attempt of the Jeffersonians
to remove Samuel P. Chase from his position on the Supreme Court in 1805;"1
the second was at the impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson in 1868.
A good illustration of the "broad construction" theory at work is the "definition"
of an impeachable offense offered by Senator Benjamin F. Butler, one of the
managers of Johnson's impeachment:
We define, therefore, an impeachable high crime or misdemeanor to be
one in its nature or consequences subversive of some fundamental or essential
principle of government, or highly prejudicial to the public interest, and this
may consist of a violation of the Constitution, of law, of an official oath, or
of duty, by an act committed or omitted, or, without violating a positive
law, by the abuse of discretionary powers from improper motives, or for
any improper purpose.' 2
As one cynic has remarked, that covers "just about everything but an unshielded
cough.""
Needless to say, President Johnson's defenders did not find themselves
enamored of Ben Butler's rather expansive "definition." In its place, they
adopted the narrow construction of the phase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors"
first espoused by Luther Martin in his successful defense of Justice Chase. Martin,
9

1 J.

STORY, COMMENTARIES

ON THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED STATES 584-85

'(5th ed. 1891) [hereinafter cited as STORY].

10 Brown, supra note 8, at 687.
11 Although the event is beyond the scope of this Note, Chase's trial and acquittal are
extremely important in the development of the impeachment process as applied to the federal
judiciary. Had the trial resulted in a conviction, one likely effect would have been the immediate impeachment of all other Federalists on the Supreme Court, including John Marshall.
See 3 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 157-222 (1919).

12

1

TRIAL OF ANDREw JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BEFORE THE

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON IMPEACHMENT BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR
HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 88 (1868) [hereinafter cited as TRIAL REcoRD]. Butler's

definition was taken from an article on the subject written by William Lawrence, a member of
the House of Representatives from Ohio. Lawrence, The Law of Impeachment, 6 Am. L.
REGISTER 641, 680 (1867). Butler submitted this article in toto at the trial, as a brief for the
prosecution. 1 TRIAL REcoRD 123-47.
13 H. CARTER, THE ANGRY ScAR 139 (1959).
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who had been a delegate from Maryland to the Constitutional Convention,"4
argued that impeachment would only lie for an indictable offense.' 5 He did not
seriously attempt to reconcile this position with parliamentary precedents, but
rather relied on policy considerations which decried those precedents:
Admit that the House of Representatives have a right to impeach for acts
which are not contrary to law, and that thereon the Senate may convict and
the officer be removed, you leave your judges and all your other officers at
the mercy of the prevailing party. You will place them much in the unhappy situation as were the people of England during the contest between
the white and red roses, while the doctrine of constructive treasons prevailed.
They must be the tools or the victims of the victorious party.' 6
A congressional impeachment based on non-criminal conduct would directly
conflict, Martin added, with the constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws."
Theodore W. Dwight, a professor at Columbia, writing shortly before
President Johnson's impeachment trial, adopted Martin's position and carried the
battle to the "broad constructionists" on their own terms' Dwight made an independent examination of the British precedents, and concluded that impeachment was simply "a method of trial" involving the application of no independent
substantive law at all." While conceding that "the judgments of the courts are
not absolutely uniform," 2 he explained away these inconsistencies with the
observation (no doubt true) that "the House of Lords has been at times impelled
by faction or overborne by importunity or overawed by fear."'" These aberrations
aside, Dwight was able to assert that
[t]he decided weight of authority is, that no impeachment will lie except
for a true crime, or, in other words, for a breach of the common or statute
law, which, if committed within any
county of England, would be the
subject of indictment or information. 22
Applying this conclusion to the law regarding impeachment of federal officials in
the United States, Dwight was able to further narrow the proper grounds for
conviction:
A basis for a very important conclusion has now been laid. It is this: as
there are under the laws of the United States no common-law crimes, but
only those which are contrary to some positive statutory rule, there can be
14 Although now largely forgotten, Martin was "an acknowledged leader of the American
bar for two generations." The Attorney General of Maryland for thirty years, Martin was also
known as the "heaviest drinker of that period of heavy drinking men." For an interesting

biography of Martin, see Gould, Luther Martin, in 2
15

REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF THE HON.
CONG. 432 (1804); 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF
16 REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF THE HON.
CONG. 434 (1804); 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF

17

CONG.

18
19
20
21
22

GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 3-46.
SAMUEL CHASE 175 (1805); 14 ANNALS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 762 (1907).
SAMUEL CHASE 177 '(1805); 14 ANNALS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 763 (1907).

REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF THE HON. SAMUEL CHASE

177 (1805); 14

ANNALS

OF

434 (1804); 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 763 (1907).
Dwight, Trial by Impeachment, 6 Am. L. REGISTER 257 (1867).
See id. at 258-63.
Id. at 263.
Id. at 264.
Id.

(Vol. 44:1089]

NOTES

no impeachment except for a violation of a law23 of Congress or for the
commission of a crime named in the constitution.
While these theories advanced by each side at the time of President Johnson's trial must be regarded as the most "popular" interpretation of "high
Crimes and Misdemeanors," other parties have shown little hesitancy in coming
forward with new explanations. One has suggested that, contrary to Butler,
impeachment will only lie for a "true crime," but that, contrary to Dwight, this
need not be an indictable offense. 24 Another has contended that the phrase includes only those offenses recognized as crimes or misdemeanors at the time the
Constitution was adopted.25 Indeed, a list of plausible interpretations, based
solely on the English precedents, could be extended indefinitely. The trouble, it
would seem, is that the recorded British impeachment cases simply do not lend
themselves to any one, definitive, commonly acceptable interpretation. The same,
moreover, must be said of the American cases. Thus, although the Senate of
the United States has conducted eleven impeachment trial during its history,
[t]his lengthy experience with the impeachment process has done little to
clarify the legal puzzles which surround it. Eminent authorities are still
diametrically opposed to each other on the principal points of controversy ....
Senatorial inconsistency and forgetfulness
2 6 of its own precedents
have rendered the process arbitrary and uncertain.
Thus, it would appear that there are actually two major stumbling blocks
which must thwart any attempt to conclusively define the nature of an impeachable offense: (1) The phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" has itself no
inherently ascertainable meaning and had acquired none in England by the
time it was adopted in the United States; and (2) There has been no consistent effort on the part of the Senate to supply that meaning in the cases that have come
before it. As matters now stand, therefore, the efforts of those scholars who
have essayed to define a phrase which the House of Lords, the Constitutional
Convention and the Senate have all conspired not to define, must be viewed
simply as excursions in academic speculation. No true definition of an impeachable offense will be possible until at least one of the stumbling blocks has been
removed: Either "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" must be replaced by an
explicit listing of activities which may be deemed impeachable, or the conduct
of impeachment trials must be turned over to some tribunal better equipped to
interpret, and consistently apply, the present constitutional provision.
III. The Senate As a Court of Justice
While de Tocqueville may have found the substantive aspects of impeachment in America "alarming," he was scarcely less troubled over the procedural
provisions:
23

Id. at 268.

24 Van Nest, Impeachable Offences under the Constitution of the United States, 16 Am.
L. REv. 798, 816-17 (1882).
25 2 TRxAL REcoRw 140.
26 Turner, The Impeachment of John Pickering, 54 Am. HIST. REv. 485, 506-07 '(1949).
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[I] am not sure that political jurisdiction, as it is constituted in the United
States, is not, all things considered, the most formidable weapon that has
ever been placed in the grasp of a majority. When the American republics
begin to degenerate, it will be easy to verify the truth of this observation
by remarking whether the number of political impeachments is increased.2
The provisions which so concerned de Tocqueville are clause 5 of article I,
section 2, giving the House of Representatives "sole Power of Impeachment,"2
and clause 6 of article I, section 3, which gives the Senate "Sole Power to try all
Impeachments," with a concurrence of two-thirds of those present necessary for
conviction. This procedure is modeled, of course, on the practice followed in
Britain, whereby the House of Commons impeached and the trial was conducted
by the House of Lords. At first glance, it might seem natural enough that the
founders of the new Republic would adopt this familiar procedure from their
erstwhile "mother" country. Upon consideration, however, the choice seems
strangely inconsistent with the remainder of the Constitution which they drew up
in the summer of 1787.9
The original resolutions put before the convention by Edmund Randolph
and Charles Pinckney both provided for the trial of impeachment to be conducted by the judicial, rather than the legislative, branch. Randolph apparently
anticipated that trial would be before a lower federal court with appeal to "the
supreme tribunal,""0 while Pinckney placed the actual trial of such cases within
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.3" Later suggestions were introduced by John Dickinson 2 and Alexander Hamilton,33 but the draft constitution
27 1 A. DE TOCt UVILLE, supra note 3, at 115.
28 "Impeachment" is here used in its literal sense, meaning simply an "accusation." Thus,
under the present constitutional provisions, the House of Representatives alone has power to
bring a public official to trial before the Senate, and it does this by accusing (impeaching)
him of certain acts which, in the opinion of a majority of the House, amount to "high Crimes
and Misdemeanors." These accusations are sent along to the Senate in the form of a document
called the "articles of impeachment." The Senate thereupon appoints certain of its members
to act as prosecuting attorneys, or "managers" of the "impeachment." If two-thirds of the
senators present find (1) that the official did, in fact, commit the acts which the House has
charged him with, and (2) that these acts amount to "high Crimes and Misdemeanors," then
the official stands convicted and is subject to the penalties provided in the Constitution. See
text accompanying note 79 infra. Thus, the word "impeachment," properly speaking, only
describes the first step in a long and somewhat involved process. In addition, however, "impeachment" has also come to be accepted as a shorthand term applicable to the whole process
of accusation, trial and judgment. For purposes of convenience, this Note follows the common
usage and, depending upon the context, employs the term "impeachment" to describe both the
formal accusation, and the entire process initiated by that accusation.
29 See Lydick, Tyranny of Impeachment Procedure, 8 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 257 (1930):
Why such a hybrid as the present impeachment law is tolerated is an unsolved
enigma. The present Impeachment Procedure may have well fitted in the general
scheme of the English Government when it originated over there. It was entirely
out of tune with American ideals when first adopted over here. Id. at 270.
30
Resd. that a National Judiciary be established . . . that the jurisdiction of the
inferior tribunals shall be to hear & determine in the first instance, and of the supreme
tribunal to hear and determine in the dernier resort . . . impeachments of any
National officers, and questions which may involve the national peace and harmony.

1

FARRAND

31

21-22.

One of these Courts shall be termed the Supreme Court whose Jurisdiction shall
extend to .. . the trial of impeachments of Officers of the United States. . . . In
cases of impeachment affecting Ambassadors & other public Ministers the Jurisdiction

shall be original ....

3

FAIRAND

600.

32 Dickinson moved that the President "be removable by the national legislature upon
request by a majority of the legislatures of the individual States." 1 FARRAND 78.
33 On June 18, 1887, Hamilton introduced a list of suggestions, including the following:
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submitted by the Committee of Detail on August 6, 1787 included the following:
"The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend . . . to the trial of impeachments of Officers of the United States ....
In cases of impeachment...
this jurisdiction shall be original.""4 The first mention of any trial of impeachments before the Senate was not made until August 22, 1787, just three weeks
before the close of the convention, and then it was limited to the trial of members
of the Supreme Court. 5 The idea that the Senate should try all impeachments
was not put before the convention until September 4, in the report of the Committee of Eleven. 6 Although this recommendation finally was adopted by the
convention as a whole, James Madison, the "father of the Constitution," expressed strong reservations about it:
Mr. Madison objected to a trial of the President by the Senate, especially
as he was to be impeached by the other branch of the Legislature, and for
any act which might be called a misdemesnor [sic]. The President under
these circumstances was made improperly dependent He would prefer
the supreme Court for the trial37 of impeachments, or rather a tribunal of
which that should form a part.
Madison's thoughts were recognized by others. "Few parts of the Constitution have been assailed with more vigor," wrote Story, "and few have been
defended with more ability." ' Hamilton devoted two numbers of The Federalist
to a defense of the impeachment procedures of the Constitution,3 9 and Story was
able to fill some thirty-one sections of his Commentaries in the same task."°
Unfortunately, the history of the process they so strenuously defended belies the
logic that they attempted to infuse into it. Impeachment as it was known in
England was already a moribund process at the time the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia:
[b]ut, before this ancient method of trial thus passed into desuetude in the
land of its birth, it was embodied, in a modified form, first, in the several
State constitutions, and, finally, in the Constitution of the United States.
And so, at rare intervals, this ghost of the past stalks
upon the shores of
41
the New World as a spirit exorcised from the Old.
If it may be assumed for the moment that a ghost is a creature with form but
little substance, then the ghost analogy is an apt one. As Hamilton and Story
The Governour Senators and all officers of the United States to be liable to
impeachment for mal--[sic] and corrupt conduct .. . all impeachments to be tried
by a Court to consist of the Chief
[sic] or Judge of the Superior Court of Law
of each State ....
1 FARRAND 292.
34 2 FARRAND 186.
35 The Committee of Detail recommended that "[t]he Judges of the Supreme Court shall
be triable by the Senate, on impeachment by the House of Representatives." 2 FARRAND 367.
36 The Committee recommended that "t]he Senate of the United States shall have power
to try all impeachments; but no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two
thirds of the Members present." 2 FAR AND 493.
37

2 FRRAuND 551.

38
39
40
41

1 STORY 547.
TH. FEDERALiST Nos. 65, 66.
1 STORY §§ 745-75.
Taylor, supra note 7, at 502.
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demonstrated, it is entirely possible to defend, in abstracto, the present Constitution as providing a suitable form for the conduct of trials in cases of impeachment. Substantively, however, an examination of that form in light of the actual,
historical trials it has governed reveals a process which cannot so readily be
justified. This is illustrated, above all, in that "most remarkable event in the
annals of jurisprudence"42 - the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson.
Happily, the story of President Johnson's impeachment, trial and acquittal
has been effectively told many times."' While it is not feasible to recount the
details of the entire affair here, a brief look at one incident during the trial will
serve to point up many shortcomings of the present impeachment procedure. The
manner in which the Senate majority handled the admission of evidence is
particularly enlightening.
The bill of impeachment presented against President Johnson by the House
of Representatives was a ponderous, deliberately vague affair "embracing all
Johnson's alleged offences, from the misdemeanor of malfeasance in office to
'
The basic charge was that Johnson, "with
the high crime of bad manners." 44
intent to violate the Constitution of the United States," had ignored the Tenure
of Office Act in attempting to remove Edwin M. Stanton, his ambitious Secretary
of War. 5 In an effort to refute this averment of intent, Johnson's lawyers proposed to introduce evidence that the President had been formally advised by his
cabinet that the Tenure of Office Act was itself unconstitutional. Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy under both Presidents Lincoln and Johnson, was placed
on the stand and the defense made the following offer of proof:
We offer to prove that the President, at a meeting of the cabinet while the
bill was before the President for his approval, laid before the cabinet the
tenure-of-civil-office bill for their consideration and advice to the President
respecting his approval of the bill; and thereupon the members of the
Cabinet then present gave their advice to the President that the bill was
unconstitutional, and should be returned to Congress with his objections,
and that the duty of preparing a message, setting forth the objections to
the constitutionality of the bill, was devolved on Mr. Seward and Mr.
by the President and
Stanton; to be followed by proof as to what was done
46
cabinet up to the time of sending in the message.
A long and important debate ensued on the admissibility of this evidence.
Ben Butler, in a "characteristically demagogic" argument,"7 charged that the
opinion of the President's cabinet on the wisdom of a piece of legislation could
not be offered as an excuse for the President's failure to obey the law once it

42

1 R.

FOSTER, COMMENTARIES

ON THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED STATES

546

(1896).
43 For an interesting work on the subject, see D. DEwirr, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL
OF ANDREW JOHNSON (1903). Although the style is dated, Dewitt's narrative is still considered a minor classic. See also G. MILTON, THE AGE OF HATE 486-612 (1930) [hereinafter
cited as MILTON].
44 F. HILL, DEcISIVE BATTLES OF THE LAw 144 (1907).
45 1 TRIAL REcORD 7.
46 Id. at 676.

47

MILTON

561.
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had been passed over his veto.4" William M. Evarts, a leader of the defense forces,
quickly cleared away Butler's smoke screen:
Whenever any such pretension as that is set forth here, that the order of
the cabinet in council for any act of the President is to shield him from his
amenability under the Constitution for trial and judgment upon his act
before this constitutional tribunal, it will be time enough to insist upon
the argument, or to attempt an answer. 9
The force of the argument which Evarts went on to present, and the lack
of any sound answer to it, greatly worried the managers of the impeachment.
The Senate adjourned at the close of Evarts' remarks, allowing the managers
a night of "great party drilling and caucussing"' 0 to line up the necessary votes.
The proceedings of the next day (Saturday, April 18) opened with a speech
against admission of the evidence by Senator Wilson of Massachusetts.51 He
was answered by Benjamin R. Curtis, formerly Justice Curtis of the United
States Supreme Court." The bill of impeachment, Curtis reminded his audience,
specifically averred that Johnson had acted with intent to violate the Constitution. If, as Senator Wilson would now have it, this allegation of intent was
mere surplusage, Curtis reasoned that this was not the time to argue it. The
evidence should be admitted, he claimed, and if the Senators later found the
President's intent immaterial, they could simply ignore it. If, on the other hand,
they should determine to try the President for the intentional offenses he was
actually charged with, then
they ought to have before them the fact that he acted by the advice of the
usual and proper advisers; that he resorted to the best means within his
reach to form a safe opinion upon this subject, and that therefore it is
a fair conclusion that when he did form that opinion it was an honest and
fixed opinion, which he felt he must carry out in practice if the proper
occasion should arise. It is in this
3 point of view, and this point of view
only, that we offer this evidence.
The debate having ended, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, presiding over
the Senate by constitutional mandate, 4 delivered his ruling. He pointed out
that the admissibility, rather than the weight, of the proposed evidence was the
question in issue. "To determine that question," he said, "it is necessary to see
what is charged in the articles of impeachment." 55 Finding that the President
was in fact charged with acting with intent to violate the Constitution, Chase
ruled the testimony admissible. But the radicals were not to be defeated so easily.
Senator Howard of Michigan rose quicky and moved that the question be sub48 1 TRIAL REcoRD 676-77.
49 Id. at 679.
50

MILTON 562.

1 TML RacoRD 681-89.
52 Id. at 689-93. Curtis' judicial career is probably best remembered for his dissent in
the Dred Scott Case, 60 U.S. '(19 How.) 393, 564-633 (1857).
53 1 TRIAL RECORD 691.
54 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 specifically provides: "When the President of the United States
51

is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside ....

55

Id. at 693.

.
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mitted to the floor. The roll was called, and the Senate of the United States
arbitrarily voted to suppress the evidence - twenty-nine to twenty.5 6
Although much could be said about this incident, Chief Justice Chase
probably summed it up best himself the next day-when he wrote:
I could conceive of no evidence more proper to be received, or more
appropriate to enlighten the court as to the intent with which the act was
done.... The vote, I fear, indicated a purpose which, if carried into effect,
will not satisfy the American people, unless they are prepared to admit
that Congress is above the Constitution. 57
Some have expressed the same thought with a little less restraint:
It was the sort of justice which the cur proposed for the mouse in Alice's
Wonderland:
"I'll be judge-I'll be jury!"
Said cunning old Fury.
"I'll try the whole cause
58
And condemn you to death!" 1
IV. A Proposal for Reform
The impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson is, of course, an extreme example, a glaring symptom of what one historian aptly termed the "Age of Hate"
in American history.59 However, that characterization does not necessarily detract
from the value of the episode as illustrative of the nature of American impeachment proceedings in general. On examination, some scholars have concluded
that serious defects are to be expected in any instance where a governmental
body essentially legislative in nature (like the Senate) attempts to assume a
function essentially judicial in character (like the trial of a President). Dean
Pound isolated the following as common characteristics of such "legislative
justice":
[LIegislative justice is unequal, uncertain, and capricious.
[L]egislative justice in its relatively short history in this country and
in the relatively small number of cases in which it was exercised showed
the influence of personal solicitation, lobbying and even corruption far
beyond anything which even the most bitter opponent of our judicial system
has charged against the courts ....
[LIegislative justice has always proved highly susceptible to the influence of passion and prejudice.
Closely related to the foregoing characteristic of legislative justice
is .. .the preponderance of purely partisan or political motives as grounds
of decision.
[L]egislative justice has been disfigured very generally by the practice
of participation in argument and decision by many who had not heard all
the evidence and 6participation in the decision by many who had not heard
all the arguments. 1
56

57

Id.

Letter from Salmon P. Chase to Gerritt Smith, April 19, 1868, quoted in MILTON 564.

58 F. HILL, supra note 44, at 158-59.
59 This is the title of Milton's book cited in note 43 supra.

60 Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 CoLum. L. REv. 1, 7-11 (1914).
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To the extent that these conclusions are correct, responsibility for the evils
so graphically illustrated in President Johnson's trial cannot be assigned solely to
a group of power-mad radicals who grossly misused the impeachment process in
their attempt to gain control of the White House. Rather, some blame must
be shared by the process itself, a process which, by its very nature, invites such
abuse. The Senate may leave something to be desired as a court, but, in fact,
it was never designed to act as a court and its members are singularly not elected
for their capacity to serve as judges. The fault does not lie with the individual
Senators, or even in the Senate as an institution, but rather in some fundamental
incompatibility between the legislative and judicial function. The framers of the
Constitution seemed to recognize this incompatibility when they specifically
deprived Congress of the power to pass bills of attainder and ex post facto laws."1
Indeed, the distinction may be seen as simply one facet of the broad principle
of separation of powers which underlies the entire governmental structure laid
down in 1787. 62 Unfortunately, despite the efforts of Madison" and others,6"
the framers may have overlooked that salutary principle when they adopted the
present impeachment provisions of the Federal Constitution.
If, then, the United States Senate is something less than ideal as a tribunal
for the trial of a President - or, for that matter, any other civil officer of the
United States" - what other, more suitable forum is available? The example
of the state of Nebraska may be instructive in this regard. The impeachment of
Governor Butler of that state in 1871 was reputedly so partisan that a few years
later the legislature passed a joint resolution expunging all record of the affair
from the journals." When the time came to draw up a new constitution in 1875,
the framers determined that any future impeachment trial would be conducted as
"a strictly judicial investigation according to judicial methods."6 " The actual
power to impeach is retained by the legislature, but the power to try such impeachments is now vested in the Nebraska Supreme Court. If a supreme court
justice is himself impeached, he is tried by a panel made up of "all the judges
of the District Court in the State." Whichever body conducts the trial, a majority
of two-thirds of the members of the court of impeachment is necessary for a
conviction."
Admittedly, Nebraska's lead has not been widely followed in other jurisdictions. The Missouri constitution of 1945 seems to contain the most similar provision: "All impeachments shall be tried before the supreme court, except that
61 U.S.

CONST. art. I, § 9.
62 See Lydick, supra note 29, at 257.
63 See text accompanying note 37 supra.

64

65
66

Mr. [Rufus] King expressed his apprehensions that an extreme caution in favor
of liberty might enervate the Government we were forming. He wished the House
to recur to the primitive axiom that the three great departments of Govts. should be
separate & independent . . . [U]nder no circumstances ought [the President] to be
impeached by the Legislature. This would be destructive of his independence and of
the principles of the Constitution. 2 FARRAND 66-67.
See note 77 infra.
Joint Resolution of February 15, 1877, Neb. Laws 14th Sess. 257 provides:
That the records of the impeachment and removal from office of David Butler,
late Governor, be and the same are hereby expunged from the journals of the senate
and house of representatives of the eighth session of the legislature of Nebraska.

67 See State v. Hastings, 37 Neb. 96, 114-15, 55 N.W. 774, 780 (1893).
68

NEB. CONST. art. 3, § 17.
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the governor or a member of the supreme court shall be tried by a special commission of seven eminent jurists to be elected by the senate."69 The court for
the trial of impeachments in New York is made up of "the president of the
senate, the senators, or the major part of them, and the judges of the court
of appeals, or the major part of them.""0 This rather unusual arrangement was
adopted in 1846 because at the time it was felt that the members of the Senate,
"like those of all legislative bodies, were more or less imbued with partisan feelings," making it necessary to infuse "into the court a share of the judicial force
to restrain that feeling." 71 With the exceptions of Indiana and Oregon, the provisions of other state constitutions are modeled more or less strictly on the present
federal structure."2 The Indiana legislature has an option whereby it may drop
the facade of judicial process altogether,7 3 while Oregon has gone to the other
extreme in making the trial of political offenses a strictly judicial affair:
Public Officers shall not be impeached, but incompetency, corruption,
malfeasance, or delinquency in office may be tried in the same manner as
criminal offences (sic), and judgment may be given of dismissal from 7Office, and such further punishment as may have been prescribed by law. 4

It is submitted that this general uniformity among the states reflects not
so much a satisfaction with the legislative trial of impeachments, as a simple
lack of concern with the whole subject. As one authority wrote over a hundred
years ago, "[t]he exercise of the power of impeachment is fortunately of such
69 Mo. CONST. art. 7, § 2.
70 N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 10. A somewhat similar procedure was proposed for the trial of
federal impeachments by Senator Hiram Bingham of Connecticut in 1931. He suggested a
constitutional amendment which would give either House the right to impeach, with trial
before a court consisting of twenty members of the other House and four members of the
Supreme Court. Bingham, A Proposed Constitutional Amendment Regarding Impeachment
Proceedings, 65 U.S.L. REV. 323 (1931).
71

DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS

OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTI-

OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 557 (1846), quoted in 2 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE
403 (1959).
72 The great majority of states follow the federal procedure strictly, with impeachment by
a majority vote of the lower house of the legislature and conviction upon a two-thirds vote of
the upper house. ARIZ. CONST. art. 8, pt. 2, §§ 1, 2; ARK. CONST. art. 15 § 2; CALIF. CONST.
art. 4, § 17; COLO. CONST. art. 13, § 1; CONN. CONST. art. 9, §§ 1, 2; GA. CONST. §§
2-1603, -1604, -1703; IDAHO CONST. art. 5, §§ 3, 4; ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 24; IOWA CONST.
art. 3, § 19; KAN. CONST. art. 2, § 27; Ky. CONST. §§ 66, 67; LA. CONST. art. 9, § 2; ME.
CONST. art. 4, pt. 1, § 8, art. 4, pt. 2, § 6; MD. CONST. art. 3, § 26; MICH. CONST. art. 11,
§ 7; MINN. CONST. art. 4, § 14; MONT. CONST. art. 5, § 16; NEV. CONST. art. 7, § 1; N.J.
CONST. art. 7, § 3; N.M. CONST. art. 4, § 35; N.C. CONST. art. 4, §§ 3, 4; N.D. CONST. §§
194, 195; OHIO CONST. art. 2, § 23; OKLA. CONsT. art 8, §§ 3, 4; PA. CONST. art. 6, §§ 1,
2; S.D. CONST. art. 16, §§ 1, 2; TENN. CONST. art. 5, §§ 1, 2; TEX. CONST. art. 15, §§ 1-3;
VA. CONST. § 54; WASH. CONST. art. 5, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art. 4, § 9; WIs. CONST. art 7,
§ 1; WYo. CONST. art. 3, § 17. A number of states have made the process more difficult by
requiring a two-thirds vote of the lower house to impeach as well as a two-thirds vote of the
upper house to convict. DEL. CONST. art. 6, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. 4, §§ 49, 52; R.I. CONST.
art. 11, §§ 1, 2 (governor); S.C. CONST. art. 15, §§ 1, 2; UTAH CONST. art. 6, §§ 17, 18; VT.
CONST. ch. 2, §§ 53, 54. On the other hand, a few states require only a majority vote for
impeachment and a simple majority for conviction. ALA. CONST. § 173; MASS. CONST. §§
44, 51; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 38. Alaska has reversed the normal procedure by providing
for impeachment by a two-thirds vote in the senate with conviction upon a two-thirds vote in
the house of representatives. ALAS. CONST. art. 2, § 20.
73 IND. CONST. art 6, § 7 provides:
All State officers shall, for crime, incapacity, or negligence, be liable to be
removed from office, either by impeachment by the House of Representatives, to be
tried by the Senate, or by a joint resolution of the General Assembly; two-thirds of
the members elected to each branch voting, in either case, therefor.
74 ORE. CONST. art. 7, § 19 (original).
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rare occurrence that less attention has been paid to it than its importance deserves."7 In spite of this historical apathy, or perhaps because of it, the Senate's
conduct of Andrew Johnson's impeachment trial should now serve as a pointed
reminder that the subject indeed deserves considerable attention. The proposed
amendment which follows may serve as a basis for a brief consideration of some
possible improvements:
Impeachment of civil officers of the United States shall be by joint
resolution of both Houses of Congress, but no such impeachment shall be
presented to the Presidentfor his approval." An impeachment of the President or the Vice Presidentshall be tried solely in the Supreme Court. Any
other impeachment shall also be tried in the Supreme Court unless Congress
shall provide for its trial in some other court of the United States. If an
impeachment is tried in a court other than the Supreme Court, the Supreme
Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction77over the proceedings, subject to
such regulationsas Congress may establish.
First, it might be well to mention those aspects of the present process which
this amendment would not affect. It does not change the class of persons liable
to impeachment: "The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States.""8 The judgment which may be passed on an officer convicted
in a trial of impeachment likewise remains the same:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment
removal from Office, and disqualification
honor, Trust or profit under the United
shall nevertheless be liable and 79subject to
Punishment, according to Law.

shall not extend further than to
to hold and enjoy any Office of
States: but the Party convicted
Indictment, Trial, Judgment and

The trial of impeachment would continue to be conducted without a jury,"
and the President would still have no power to grant pardons "in Cases of Impeachment."8 " Perhaps surprisingly, the amendment does not even vary the
substantive grounds on which impeachment may be brought: "Treason, Bribery,
or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."' 2 Although this latter provision was
criticized at some length earlier in this Note, 3 it is felt that any need for a direct
change in its wording would be obviated by the transfer of the trial of impeach75 Lawrence, supra note 12, at 641.
76 This clause is inserted to take the proposed joint resolutions on impeachments out of the
operation of U.S. CONST. art. I, §7:
Every Order, Resolution or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment)
shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall
take Effect, shall be approved by him ....
77 This Note has been largely confined, of course, to a consideration of the federal impeachment process as applied to the President rather than judges or other civil officers
generally. While there are enough important practical distinctions to justify, and even necessitate, a separate textual treatment of impeachment as applied to the Presidency, many of the

considerations and criticisms expressed in that regard are equally applicable to the trial of other
federal officers. Thus, the suggested amendment contemplates the depoliticalization of all impeachment trials through their transfer from the Senate to the Supreme Court.
78 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.

79
80
81
82

Id. art. I, § 3.
Id. art. III, § 2.
Id. art. II,§ 2.
Id. art. II, § 4.

83

See text accompanying notes 3 to 26 supra.
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ments, and of the concomitant duty of interpreting and applying that phrase,
from the Senate to the federal courts.
While many aspects of the present impeachment procedure would thus remain stable, the reforms which the suggested amendment would introduce are
major. It is, in all essential aspects, self-executing. It would require the concurrence of a majority of the Senate, as well as the House, in any future impeachment. This change, while probably not essential, would seem desirable and
perhaps politically expedient in that it preserves an equal role in the process for
the Senate. The Senate would give up its present power to try impeachments,
and all future trials in such cases would be before a court. In a case involving
a President or Vice-President, trial could only be before the Supreme Court of
the United States. In all other cases, Congress would have power to grant original jurisdiction to a lower federal court. The trial of an impeached district
court judge might be before the judges of the circuit court of appeals for that
district, sitting en banc; the trial of a justice of the Supreme Court might be
committed to a special panel made up of several senior circuit court judges; the
trial of a circuit judge could be left to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. In addition, cases involving other, non-judicial officers of the United States
might be tried before the judges of the court of appeals for the circuit wherein
the alleged offenses took place. In cases originating in a lower court, the Supreme
Court would retain appellate jurisdiction "subject to such regulations as Congress
may establish."
The idea of holding the trial of impeachments before the Supreme Court
is, of course, far from new.84 Since this was the method of trial first proposed in
the Constitutional Convention, it received considerable attention from the early
defenders of the present system. They urged, inter alia, that the members of the
Court would not have the "fortitude" necessary to take on the task; 5 that the
Court would not enjoy the "credit and authority" required to reconcile the
people to an unpopular decision; 6 that giving the Court jurisdiction of impeachment trials would concentrate too much power in the hands of too few
men8 7 and "create a general dread of its influence";88 that the justices would
not have the political expertise needed to properly determine the nature of an impeachable offense; 89 that the Court might become too much involved in politics;9"
and that people might doubt the impartiality of judges called upon to try the man
who had appointed them. 1 Perhaps the only new objection which could be
added to this list would be the observation that, practically speaking, most recent
proposals for changes in the Supreme Court's jurisdiction have aimed at narrowing, rather than expanding, the class of cases which can come before the
court.9"
84

See text accompanying notes 30 to 37 supra.
THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 427 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 428.
88 1 STORY 558.
89 Id. at 559.
90 Id. at 560-61.
91 Id. at 561-62.
92 See Elliott, Court-CurbingProposals in Congress, 33 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 597 (1958);
McKay, Court, Congress, and Reapportionment, 63 MicH. L. REv. 255 (1964).
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There is no need to consider these objections in detail. The historical development of the Supreme Court, its growth in stature, power, and even independence, have all gone to drain many of the early arguments of whatever
force they may have formerly enjoyed. The central answer to all such arguments,
however, is simply this: the trial of a President impeached by Congress, like the
trial of an ordinary citizen indicted by a grand jury, is by nature a judicial,
rather than a legislative, function. The mere fact that some difficulties may
arise in the course of such a trial before the Supreme Court, difficulties perhaps
peculiar to the impeachment process, does not change the nature of the event.
The Constitution provides certain definite procedures whereby a President may
be politically removed from office. Impeachment is not one of these. In short,
the trial of an impeached President is a judicial, not a political, task, and it
should be turned over to that branch of the federal government properly designed to carry out such tasks. Under the proposed amendment, the Supreme
Court can only try a President after a majority of both Houses of Congress,
acting in their roles as representatives of the people, have called on it to do so.
If that constitutes an "expansion" of the Court's jurisdiction, it is an extension
wholly in keeping with the spirit of the original Constitution and its underlying
policy of the separation of powers.
V. Conclusion
One optimistic historian has concluded that, as a result of the Senate's failure
to convict Andrew Johnson, "[n]ever will the practice of deposing presidents
by political impeachment become domiciliated in this republic. Centuries will
pass by before another President of the United States can be impeached ....
,""
Unfortunately, such predictions have a habit of proving false.94 Andrew Johnson
escaped impeachment "only by the merest chance,"" and only fortune, and a
long-run period of general internal stability, have spared subsequent Presidents
from similar trials. As long as the trial of impeachments is constitutionally committed to a political, rather than judicial, institution, it will be open to political
abuse and subject to all the inherent defects of "legislative justice." 9 The Republic cannot "continue to rely solely on the intervention of the Providence that
is said to have fools and the American people in its special care."9 " If it does,
all of the efforts expended in the adoption of the twenty-fifth amendment and
in the current drive for electoral college reform might easily be wasted. Should
Providence fail, there is nothing in the present federal impeachment provisions to
prevent some future Ben Butler from constitutionally effecting the virtual destruction of the Presidency itself.
FrancisX. Wright
93 D. DEwIr, supra note 43, at 579. Some more recent historians share Dewitt's optimism.
"The power of impeachment ... is a 'rusted blunderbuss, that will probably never be taken in
hand again'."

C. ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 52 (rev. ed. 1960).

94 After Justice Chase's acquittal in 1804, Jefferson is reported to have stated that "impeachment is a farce which will not be tried again." 3 A. BEVERIDoE, supra note 11, at 222.
95 D. DEWITT, supra note 43, at 611.
96 See text accompanying note 60 supra.
97

E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT 67 (1957).

